TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- TRIWEEKLY REPORT -- 19 JUNE-9 JULY 1993

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

In reply refer to: I-15206/93

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MALCOLM TOON

SUBJECT: Task Force Russia Activity Report, 19 June -9 July 1993

The attached report covers the period immediately preceding the reorganization of Task Force Russia and its functional responsibilities within the newly established Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO). Apart from marking the end of an era, the report is noteworthy in several other respects .

First, it represents an initial attempt to identify topics for the next plenary session in Moscow. Candidates in this category include a number of difficulties we are experiencing in gaining access to relevant archival sources. This problem is noted in the first part of the study. In a parallel effort, TFR, Moscow, is intensifying its initiatives to contact Russian counterparts and seek access to documents and responses to specific queries that remain unanswered, some for extended periods of time. Those issues which do not yield results will become the basis for specific agenda items to be presented at the August-September plenary.

Secondly, the report reaffirms the importance of persistence by those responsible for pursuing leads, even if the prospects for success at times seem elusive. The long-awaited interview with the former Soviet Ambassador to Laos, Valentin Vdovin, highlighted on pages 7-9, is a testimonial to results obtained by virtue of resolve and commitment.

Without belaboring the obvious, the report underscores the critical role of media coverage in making the Commission's work and goals known to a broad-based audience. The multitude of responses summarized in Section 3 amply demonstrates the value of the press in assuring that those who have information about American service personnel are given the opportunity to share it with us.

To improve efficiencies, we have inaugurated the first of the triweekly reports that will replace the fortnightly version. As in the past, comments with respect to the material we welcome commissioners discussed and the format in which it is presented.

/signed/ Norman D. Kass Acting Executive Secretary U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs

cc:
DAS Richard Kauzlarich, (EUR & CAN)
DAS Ken Quinn, (EAP/VLC)
Mr. A. Denis Clift, (DIA Chief of Staff)
Mr. Ed Ross, (Acting DASD/POW/MIA Affairs)
Dr. Trudy Peterson, (Nat'l Archives)
Sen. Robert Smith (R-NH)
Sen. John Kerry (D-MA)
Rep. Pete Peterson, (D-FL)
Rep. Sam Johnson, (R-TX)
COL Joseph Schlatter, (DPMO)
LTC Martin Kloster, (DPMO)

TRIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

Period of Report: 19 JUNE--9 JULY 1993

1. SUMMARY:

A. The highlight of the reporting period was a series of interviews conducted in Lithuania and Latvia by a representative of Task Force Russia--Moscow (TFR-M). Several former inmates of the GULag reported contact with alleged U.S. POWs, primarily from Korea and from World War II (WWII). While the credibility of these reports varies, their substance is important because it adds further weight to the statistical indicators that U.S. POWs were held in the GULag. Over the past year, TFR has received numerous substantially-similar reports from ex-prisoners. Although they range from the circumspect and believable to the outlandish, the overall effect is too persuasive for analysts to dismiss. While ultimate proof--or disproof--lies in the archives of the Russian security services, this Baltic deployment by TFR-M added significantly to the body of circumstantial evidence indicating that U.S. POWs were transported to and held n the former Soviet Union.

B. Regarding the "1205" document, Colonel-General Volkogonov shed further light on the question of its validity in an informal exchange with TFR-M. General Volkogonov stated that he was convinced that the document was genuine and that the GRU firmly believes that Vietnamese General Tran Van Quang was the author. Volkogonov dismissed Vietnamese protests to the effect that Tran Van Quang had not held an appropriate post to present such a document to the Politburo by stating that Russian records show that Quang had a special relationship with the Politburo well before his formal appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff in 1974.

C. Also related to Indochina, TFR-M representatives, following months of unsuccessful attempts to schedule a formal interview with former Soviet ambassador to Laos Valentin Petrovich Vdovin, used local sources to find his residence and simply turned up on his doorstep. Vdovin received the TFR-M members cordially and, although he denied any contact with or knowledge of U.S. POW/MIAs, his answers to TFR-M's questions shed additional light on political and military relationships that affected the handling and treatment of U.S. POW/MIAs.

D. A visit to the Russian State Military Archive yielded disappointing results, with archival sources from key Korean and Cold War years ignored or under-reported by the Russians. At present, it is impossible to determine whether this stems from Russian reluctance to share potentially-damaging information or from a genuine misunderstanding as to what the U.S. side of the Joint Commission requires.

E. TFR-W analysts continued archival research, uncovering still more documentary evidence that elements of the U.S. Government believed that U.S. POWs had been transferred to the former Soviet Union during the Korean War. Further, TFR-W continued its program of support to POW/MIA family members, including preparations to brief a key Cold War shootdown case at an upcoming (17 July) meeting of the National Alliance of Families in Washington, D.C.

UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. During an informal meeting at Ilyinka 12, Colonel-General Volkogonov shared the "latest information from the GRU" with TFR-M representatives. Volkgonov said that, at the time of the "1205" document's dating (June 26, 19,2), the alleged author, Vietnamese General Tran Van Quang, was a Lieutenant General commanding the Fourth Military District; however, Quang was frequently sent to South Vietnam to evaluate the situation, following which he would deliver a report to the Politburo. While Quang was not formally appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff until 1974, Volkogonov pointed out that the Soviet security services cover sheet was added to the document at an undetermined date and may simply have carried Quang's rank at the time of filing. Volkogonov stressed that the important thing is that Quang made the report in question, not Quang's formal job title at the time.

(MSG CITE: MEMO FOR TFR-H, 2 JULY 1993)

B. TFR-M representatives, in the company of Russian commission member Vladimir Konstantinovich

Vinogradov, Deputy Section Chief of the Russian Ministry of Security, called on Aleksander Kandaurov, Director of the Center for Public Information of the Ministry of Security. A U.S. POW/MIA family member had met previously with Kandaurov, after which she claimed he had referred to "electronically prepared" lists of U.S. POW/MIAs provided to the Russian side of the Joint Commission. TFR-M inquired as to the substance of Kandaurov's remarks. Kandaurov denied ever having made such a statement and insisted that either his remarks had been misunderstood or that he had been the victim of faulty translation.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 301456Z JUN 93)

C. TFR-M representatives visited the Russian State Military Archives at 29 Ulitsa Admirala Makarova in Moscow to introduce a new TFR-M member and to check on the progress of TFR-funded research underway at the archive. Ludmila Vasilyevna Dvoynich and Natalia Yevgenyevna Yeliseyeva represented the archive staff. Yeliseyeva, the formal point of contact for the contracted research, claimed that all relevant archives have been researched and that the work under the terms of the current contract had been completed. Yeliseyeva handed over a summary of the fonds that have been reviewed, including brief histories of the units whose documents are stored in a particular fond. After a brief examination of the summary, TFR-M asked about the lack of documents from the early 1950s. Yeliseyeva responded that there was nothing pertinent from that period. [TFR-M comment: The work in this archive is far from complete. The researchers have either been researching and reporting the wrong information, due to a misunderstanding of Commission requirements, or the Russian side is unwilling to share the needed data.]

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 091428Z JUL 93)

D. Further progress on the issue of U.S. WW II POW/MIA remains on southern Sakhalin or the Southern Kurils depends almost entirely upon the Russian side. The U.S. side has acted n good faith, but does not have the access or independent means to locate the alleged remains--this is a job for the Russians, although the U.S. side remains ready to assist in any actual excavation. The status of U.S. research into the question of whether or not the Japanese may have held U S. POWs on the Kurils of Sakhalin is as follows:

(1) It appears highly unlikely that the Japanese maintained a formal camp or network of camps for U.S. POWs at these locations.

(2) It is possible that the Japanese brought substantial POW work details from Hokkaido or elsewhere to work on special military construction projects as the war dragged on and Japanese manpower resources dwindled. Such POW detachments could have been held under informal conditions, such as in the caves above Sapochnaya Bay cited by one source. If such POW detachments were employed, debriefings suggest that no one returned.

(3) It is highly possible that U.S. bomber crews were forced to crash land or abandon their aircraft over or near the sites in question. Executions of such crews would not be without precedent and could have given rise to the rumors of American POWs buried at various places.

EVENTS, INTERVIEWS, CONTACTS, AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. In late June, a TFR-M representative listed Lithuania and Latvia in order to follow up leads that resulted from voluntary correspondence from and contacts with local residents. The TFR-M member also visited the Paneirai Forest Memorial Site near Vilnius, Lithuania, where Jewish ghetto survivor Josephas Medaiskis claimed he saw 16-18 U.S. POWs of the Nazis executed along with 5,000 Lithuanian Jews on 23 September 1943. In all, more than 100,000 Jews may have been executed at the site and the TFR-M representative assesses that the sheer number of victims and site density would make excavation, exhumation and identification extremely impractical. The site is now respectfully-preserved and reforested, with monuments erected by Lithuania. The U.S. consular officer in Vilnius is exploring the possibility that historical documents may identify any U.S. POWs delivered to the SS control officer at the Paneirai train station on 23 September 1943. The interview program was more immediately

productive. Each interview is summarized briefly below:

(LITHUANIA)

(1) BRONIUS SKARDZIUS. Mr. Skardzius wrote the U.S. Embassy in Vilnius, telling of an alleged encounter with Americans at a Novosibirsk transit prison in (approximately) June 1952. He claims that a group of 4-5 prisoners were brought into the small room where he was being held and that two of the men were American pilots who told him they had been shot down in Korea. They were dressed in khaki shirts and trousers with no belts (prisoners were not allowed to have belts or shoelaces). One American told Skardzius that he was a captain in the Air Force. This individual was tall and had a red beard. Skardzius could not recall any details about the second alleged American. The other prisoners in the group were Germans. Skardzius also alleges that he encountered an American in Medvezhiy Ruchey Camp at Norilsk, but could not remember any details. He suggested that Vytautas Kairys of Vilnius and Jankuna Vyktoras of Sesualiai might have further information on U.S. POWs.

(2) JONAS BIELIAUSKAS. Mr. Bieliauskas claims to have seen WWII-era U.S. officers at the Krasnoyarsk and Dudinka transit camps in July and August of 1946 . He recalled that the two U.S. officers at Krasnoyarsk remained behind when he, Bielauskas, was transferred on 14 July 1946. Bieliauskas said that when he was an inmate of Norilsk Camp No. 9 in 1953, he worked with the Third Camp Division near Cement Plant No. 5. In May-June 1953, two new barracks were constructed in a corner of his compound. These barracks were separated by a double barbed wire fence with a track in between for roving patrols and guard dogs. Regular inmates were forbidden to approach within fifteen meters of the fence--otherwise they would be shot. Camp gossip said that this heavily-guarded facility was for American POWs from Korea. Bieliauskas stated that he only observed these prisoners from a distance of one hundred meters, but that they were clearly young Caucasians. The "Americans" wore standard prison clothing. Bieliauskas believes it is significant that, when the wave of prison uprisings began in May-June 1954, the "Americans" were quickly removed.

(3) JONAS ZILAITIS. Mr. Zilaitis claims to have met a "black pilot" in the second half of May 1954. The "pilot" claimed to have been shot down in Korea. The camp where the meeting occurred was Kengyr, located in the Dzezkazgan region of Kazakhstan.

(4) PRANAS PAULASKAS. Mr. Paulaskas claims to have had seven contacts with an American major named "Paul," who was allegedly driven mad at a camp in Vorkuta. The "American" was supposedly captured in Ukraine during WWII.

(5) JOKUB BRUZDEILINAS. Mr. Bruzdeilinas spent a year in the ITL R-5 prison camp in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, in 1954-55, where he claims to have encountered a Lithuanian-American who said he was a USAF major shot down in Korea. The "American's" name was Juozas (Joseph when Anglicized). He had a Lithuanian surname which Bruzdeilinas cannot remember [Note: To date, TFR-W has not been able to identify an unaccounted-for Korean War-era service member who fits this description, but the search continues]. Juozas spoke Lithuanian with a light accent and was grouped with and treated the same as the other Lithuanians in the camp. Juozas gave English lessons to the other prisoners and was "very outgoing," even though he expressed the belief that the Soviets would never let him return home to America. Bruzdeilinas believes that Juozas was born in America. During the Karaganda prison rebellion of May 15 to June 30, 1954, Juozas was placed in solitary confinement to keep him out of the action. After the rebellion had been quelled, Juozas returned to the Lithuanian contingent. In 1955, Juozas was transferred to Siberia. Bruzdeilinas never saw him again.

(6) ANTAN KEBURIS. Mr. Keburis stated that he encountered two "American" pilots from Korea in Moscow in July, 1952. Keburis was being held temporarily at a prisoner distribution center in an old czarist prison in the Krasnaya Presnya section of Moscow when two "obviously cultured men in decent civilian suits" were put into his holding room. Keburis says that these two men, each about thirty years old, made a striking contrast to the bedraggled prisoners already there. One of the "Americans" used "school German" to communicate with Keburis, telling him that they were U.S. pilots who had been captured in Korea. Keburis spent 4-5 days with the two men, then he was transferred to Chelyabinsk.

(LATVIA)

(7) AIVARS KOKINS. Mr. Kokins claims to have encountered an American citizen (non-POW/MIA) in camp ON-55/3 at Lykoshyno in Kalinin Oblast in 1976. The American, who had to use a Russian name in prison, was born in 1931 and had supposedly been arrested for illegal currency activity in Leningrad.

(8) PAVEL GRIGORYEVICH FYODOROV. Fyodorov, a retired Soviet major of engineers, claims that a U.S. B-17, which operated on the Italy-Poltava run, went missing near the end of 1944. Fyodorov asserts that the plane, along with its crew, was seized by the Soviets because Stalin had directed that the Soviet aircraft industry copy the American plane. Fyodorov says that he obtained this information from a Tupolev design bureau test pilot with whom he was imprisoned in 1952. Fyodorov believes that there still may be employees at Tupolev, including the founder's son, who should know about the plane and the fate of the crew.

(9) BORIS GRIGORJEVS. Grigorjevs, who had been impressed into the German army in 1943, was taken prisoner by the Russians in September, 1944, and interned at the Cherepovets POW camp. Shortly after Christmas, 1944, Grigorjevs was assigned to a work detail in a new barracks when five to eight people entered who were speaking "American English." Grigorjevs only got a good look at the last two men in the group. The first was tall and blond, about 25, wearing a brown leather helmet and a short light-colored jacket. The second man appeared somewhat older. Immediately, the Soviet officer accompanying the prisoners began cursing at the officer in charge of the work detail for having POWs working in the barracks. Grigorjevs "realized he had stumbled onto a secret" and slipped away. His companion remained behind and Grigorjevs never saw him again. Grigorjevs never gained another opportunity to return to the barracks where the "Americans" were kept. Grigorjevs was later imprisoned at Sukhobezvodny in Gorky Oblast, where he heard rumors of imprisoned Americans, although he personally never encountered any.

(10) EVALDS LIZBOVSKIS. Mr. Lizbovskis claims to have encountered an American citizen (non-POW/MIA) at Pskov transit jail in April of 1963. The American's family name was "Sunus" or "Sunas," and he had been arrested by the Soviet secret service just after the end of WWII. Lizbovskis also says that he encountered a black American in the camp system in Mordovia around 1963. Lizbovskis was a prisoner at Sosnovka Camp No. 3, while the American was imprisoned in Sosnovka No. 10, which was only for foreigners. Lizbovskis had heard that the American had been convicted of "treason," and believes he was over thirty years old in 1963.

[TFR NOTE: Although none of these reports taken alone offers conclusive proof that U.S. POWS were transported to the former Soviet Union, taken together they continue to develop a pattern of reporting that has emerged over the months--repeated eyewitness encounters with U.S. pilots or aircrew members from the Korean War period. It appears noteworthy that the interviewees from this trip and from previous TFR-M efforts come from different parts of the former USSR and do not know each other, yet tell strikingly similar stories from the same general period (during and after the Korean War). TFR-W is currently engaged in an effort to correlate all previous reports and seek to identify further patterns, such as times and places of sightings.]

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 070752Z JUL 93; 080947Z JUL 93; 070741Z JUL 93; 021916Z JUL 93]

B. TFR-M interviewed Valentin Petrovich Vdovin, Soviet ambassador to Laos from 1972-1976, at his dacha outside of Moscow. After months of attempting to schedule a formal interview and repeated rebuffs from the Russian side, TFR-M tracked down Vdovin with the help of a Russian journalist. Two TFR-M members then appeared at Mr. Vdovin's front door. A representative of the Russian side had been invited to come along, but declined, claiming that Vdovin did not know anything of value. In response to TFR-M's questions, Vdovin stated that:

(1) He personally had no contact with nor knowledge of U.S. POW/MIAs.

(2) The Communist Pathet Lao movement neither made nor executed policy decisions independent of the

Vietnamese. All of the major political, diplomatic and military actions were driven by Hanoi.

(3) Except for a northern section of Laos controlled by the Chinese, Hanoi controlled events, including areas outside the Ho Chi Minh Trail zone.

(4) Soviet pilots supported the movement of Pathet Lao personnel around Laos and between Vientiane and Hanoi.

(5) Vdovin insists that he never acted as an intermediary between the U.S. and the Pathet Lao. He claims that the Soviet Union could not do anything in Laos without consulting Hanoi.

(6) Vdovin stated that he had good relations with the KGB and GRU representatives on station, but that they never spoke about POW/MIA issues. Vdovin does not, however, exclude the possibility that temporary duty personnel on special assignment from Moscow were involved in interrogating U.S. POWs--but he states emphatically that he had no personal knowledge of such operations.

(7) Although Soviet personnel in Laos had neither direct nor indirect access to U.S. POWs or Laotian interrogation reports, Vdovin says the KGB or GRU could have had special access about which he would not have known.

(8) Vdovin categorically denied ever having had estimates of the number of Americans killed in Laos or held in captivity there. He stated that he had no access to Pathet Lao estimates.

(9) Vdovin pointed out that the ambassador does not always know everything in which the security services personnel are involved.

(10) Vdovin categorically denied any knowledge about U.S. POWs having been transferred to the Soviet Union.

(11) Vdovin does not believe that any prisoners were transferred to China, since relations between Hanoi and Beijing were extremely bad during his tenure as ambassador. The Chinese had cut the land route to Hanoi, and the Soviets had to bring in supplies by sea and air, with the air route running through India, Burma and Laos to Hanoi.

(12) Vdovin said that the Pathet Lao policy toward captured American pilots was to turn them over directly to the Vietnamese.

(13) Vdovin stated that, although he had no personal knowledge of it, he believed the prison management system in Laos was highly centralized.

(14) Vdovin does not believe the Pathet Lao would have killed any U.S. POWs, since the Laotians, in his view, were gentle, Passive people, unlikely to kill anyone. Vdovin feels that, if prisoners were killed, they were killed by the Vietnamese.

(15) Vdovin stated that there was no official Soviet Government policy to permit advisors or other Soviet personnel to visit camps holding U.S. prisoners.

(16) Vdovin stated that there were no Soviet military advisors in Laos during the war, since the Vietnamese advised the Laotians.

(17) Vdovin said that, after the war, Soviet advisors were sometimes provided with armed or unarmed Laotian escorts, since the situation had become very dangerous.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 081239Z JUL 93]

C. TFR-M representatives interviewed Evgeniy Vasilievitch Kobelov, who served as correspondent for

the Soviet news agency TASS in Vietnam from 1965-1968. Kobelov, who still maintains close ties to Vietnam and openly sympathizes with Hanoi, declared that the "1205" figure was a major overestimate of the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese. He stated that this number probably came about because the same prisoners were counted multiple times at multiple reporting levels. He also said that he cannot understand the persistent U.S. belief that prisoners might still be held by the Vietnamese; further, Kobelov said that he was convinced that, following the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, Hanoi would be more forthcoming with remains and information. Kobelov had just returned from a two-week trip to Vietnam, and he said that, "the Vietnamese frequently expressed a desire for the Americans to return, this time as partners, and that they harbor no ill feelings toward the U.S. Kobelov also reminisced about a group interview in which he participated with captured U.S. airmen Robert Shoemaker and Richard Allen Stratton. Kobelov has also published a book on his experiences in Vietnam which names POWs James Lindberg Hughes, Gordon Albert Larson, and Jayrus Richard Shaivelle (James Richard Shively).

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 091431Z JUL 93]

D. TFR-M interviewed Aleksandr Georgievich Dmitriyev, who claims a family association with the KGB dating back to the founding of the Cheka under Felix Dzherzhinsky. Dmitriyev claims intimate knowledge of the KGB and MVD archives and states that he has seen documents pertinent to the POW/MIA issue. Further, he is willing to report to a meeting of the Joint Commission exactly where those relevant documents are held and what is in them. Dmitriyev repeatedly expressed his admiration for the U.S. for not giving up on its POW/MIAs, declaring, "That's the way civilized people are supposed to act." He was startled when he realized that the U.S. side has no direct access to any of the special archives and stated that he was appalled at the procedures necessary to view a document. He pledged his help wherever possible. [TFR Note: The U.S. side of the Joint Commission will determine whether it desires to have Dmitriyev present his testimony at the upcoming Moscow meeting.]

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 210840Z JUN 93]

E. TFR-M met with Konstantin Natanovich Borovoy, a successful Russian entrepreneur who involved himself in the POW/MIA issue in the past. Borovoy stated that his interest in the issue has waned and that his involvement had cost him a great deal of money. He agreed to provide TFR-M with letters he received in response to a privately-funded publicity campaign on this issue, as well as giving the names of several other people he felt were worth contacting.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 091428Z JUL 93]

F. TFR-M also engaged in a series of telephonic contacts and efforts to track down various leads and individuals, as well as to confirm or disprove reports from unilateral sources. These efforts will result in field deployments to the Crimea and to Krasnodar in the near future.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 091428Z JUL 93]

4. SIGNIFICANT CONUS ACTIVITIES:

A. TFR-W continues to press for the declassification of Korean War-era archival documents, especially the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Big Switch and Little Switch debriefing files, and the Far East Command (FEC) G2 files, both held at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

B. On 18 June 1993, a TFR-W representative discovered the Operation WRINGER holdings at the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. These holdings consist of a total of approximately 40,000 files, each about ten pages in length, on the debriefings of German and Japanese WWII POW returnees from the Soviet GULag. These debriefings were conducted from the end of WWII through the mid-1950s. There are 298 large cartons of German debriefings conducted by the 7001st Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) and 68 cartons of Japanese debriefings conducted by the 6004th AISS. Each carton contains about 100 files. Virtually every file contains a section wherein the returnee

was queried about other foreigners in the camp system. Some reports of U.S. personnel in the GULag have their origins here, but details have been lost over the years. TFR-W analysts believe that there is no viable alternative to a full review of these files. At present, the Operation WRINGER files are still classified, but TFR is actively seeking their declassification.

5 RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. The U.S. side of the Joint Commission should consider introducing Dmitriyev as a source on archival holdings at the upcoming Moscow plenary session. TFR-M will support this decision-making process by providing specifics as to what information Dmitriyev would present, as well as offering an assessment as to his credibility.

B. TFR should, in conjunction with the U.S. embassies in the Baltic states, actively pursue all leads arising from the publicity and interview campaigns in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Access to local security service historical archival holdings, if gained, would result in a TFR-W deployment.

C. TFR should seek support from a reserve unit to exploit the extensive Operation WRINGER files, since TFR does not have adequate manpower to review 40,000 files in detail in a timely manner.

D. TFR-W should continue to press the declassification. issue on U.S. archival documents pertinent to the POW/MIA issue

E. TFR-M should continue to press for expanded access to the Russian special archives, documenting ail Russian refusals.

F. TFR-W should embark upon an expanded effort to correlate all reports of encounters with U.S. POWs in the GULag, to include TFR contacts, the Operation WRINGER files, and an additional review of all other pertinent holdings.

G. TFR-M should press the Russian side for specific sources and source materials used to compile the "199" list.

ANNEX A TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA 19 JUNE-9 JUNE 1993 TRIWEEKLY REPORT

1. Annex C to Task Force Russia 29 May-11 June 93 Biweekly Report showed the analysis of a list of 99 U.S. Korean War POWs provided by the Russians at the December 1992 meeting U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. Each name on the list was accompanied by a source, most of which were-from various news media, in effect, a clipping file. Of the 99 names, 62 have been identified.

2. While most of the information sources have been truly a traceable news media origin, 23 of the names are sourced rather opaquely, "according to data of the Korean People's Army (22 of the names have been identified). Of the 17 POWs known to have died in enemy hands, 13 are in this category. One more POW known to have died in enemy hands is sourced "according to People's Army of Korea and Chinese Volunteers." In effect, 77 percent of the deaths on this list come from the category that amount to only 36 percent of the names. The question is why are so many deaths concentrated in such poorly identified category?

3. The Russians did not provide any of the original documents pertaining to this list to the U.S. side of the Commission but, as with every other list, only a digest of information prepared specifically for us. A request will be shortly forwarded to the Russian side asking for original documentation that explains exactly what the term "according to data of the Korean People's Army" means.

Based on Information from the

Korean People's army

(Personnel Known to Have Died in Enemy Hands)

No.	No. on Russian List	Name	Rank	Unit
1.	8.	Brockman, John T.	CPT	21st Inf/24ID
2.	11.	Cox, Jensen C.	1Lt	21st Inf/24ID
3.	12.	Jester, William F.	1Lt	21st Inf/24ID
4.	13.	Lewis, Warren G.	1Lt	21st Inf/24ID
5.	14.	Tomaszewski, Waclaw A.	1LT	34th Inf/24ID
6.	16.	Adams, Robert I.	1Lt	34th Inf/24ID
7.	17.	Bergman, William J.	1Lt	34th Inf/24ID
8.	21.	Barter, Charles T.	MAJ	63rd FA/24ID
9.	24.	Maynard, Edward W.	CPT	53rd FA/24ID
10.	25.	Pearson, Raymond E.	2LT	63rd FA/24ID
11.	26.	Roth, Bernard F.	1Lt	11th FA/24ID
12.	29.	Kristianoff, George W.	CPT	24Recon/24ID
13.*	51.	Duncan, Wyatt G., Jr.	MSG	2nd Engr/24ID

*Source reads "According to People's Army of Korea and Chinese Volunteers."

Based on News Media Accounts*
(Personnel Known to Have Died in Enemy Hands)

1.	1.	Moss, Lawrence D.	1LT	52nd FA/24ID
2.	4.	Dunham, Leland R.	MAJ	34th Inf/24ID
3.	75.	Carlson, Ralph W.	SGT	25Recon/25ID
4.	80.	Fitzgerald, John J.	PFC	25Recon/25ID

*News Media:

1. Special Correspondent of "Singhua," Korean Front (Note: Singhua was actually a Chinese news bureau.)

2. From Appeal of American POWs to the American people in "Pravda" 21 FEB 51.

3. From Appeal to Soldiers of American Army.

4. From Appeal to Soldiers of American Army.